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SUPREME COURT RAMIFICATIONS

THE RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION AND THE
PRODUCTION OF CORPORATE
DOCUMENTS: BRASWELL v. UNITED
STATES
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution assures
the individual the right to refuse to incriminate himself by his
own testimony in a criminal proceeding.' The right against self' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in part that "[n]o person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ..
" Id. Although
the ability to avoid self-incrimination is as much a "right" as others granted by the Constitution, it has consistently been referred to as a privilege. See L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FirT
AMENDMENT at vii-viii (1968).
The self-incrimination clause is a constant reminder of the belief in the importance of
the individual. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Justice Goldberg,
writing for the Court, enumerated the policies supporting the privilege as:
reflect[ing] many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited
by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play ....
Id. at 55. See generally Bonventre, An Alternative to the ConstitutionalPrivilege Against SelfIncrimination, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 31, 51-63 (1982) (discussing policies of mercy, privacy,
and fairness as foundation for privilege); Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence From a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 601-05
(1970) (discussing integrity of judicial system and individual privacy); Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 679-98
(1968) (discussing privacy, cruelty, fairness, political liberty and equal protection).
The concern with protecting the individual from self-incrimination is the result of a long
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incrimination is available in any proceeding, criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and protects
any disclosures which could be used to incriminate the individual
in any future criminal proceeding.' The privilege is "essentially a
personal one, applying only to natural individuals." 3 Organizastruggle between the conflicting concepts of individual liberty and the exercise of collective
state power. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting
appellant's counsel). The First Congress proposed the language of the fifth amendment "in
order to ensure that the right against self-incrimination would be protected against interference by the newly created federal government." M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFrH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 1 (1980). See also Corwin,
The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1930)
(privilege traced to administration of oath of ex officio in proceedings of English ecclesiastical courts and High Commission); Morgan, The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1949) (same); Note, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 775-83 (1935) (tracing constitutional privilege to proceedings of the supreme colonial courts). See generally C. MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 114-117 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE IN
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
The self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment has been held applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964). In Malloy, the Court noted that "[i]t
would be incongruous to have
different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared
prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court." Id.
The Malloy decision overruled the long standing doctrine held in Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908), which precluded implication of fifth amendment concerns in state actions through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 89.
' See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966). The
privilege protects persons "in all settings . .. from being compelled to incriminate themselves." Id. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (grand jury investigation); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970) (pretrial discovery); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967) (juvenile hearing); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (civil suit for denaturalization), reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 948 (1958); Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1983)
(psychiatric evaluations). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 121 (privilege protects
against danger of legal criminal liability); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2254-2257 (discussing facts protected from disclosure). The privilege may be invoked only when the testimonial activity is compelled. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (surrender of incriminating documents by taxpayer's accountant is not action of compelling nature
directly against taxpayer); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79-80 (1964) (state
witness cannot be compelled to give testimony, incriminating him under federal law, unless
testimony will not be used against him by federal officials). See also Ritchie, Compulsion That
Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 398-429
(1977) (delineating permissible government conduct and exercise of privilege); Comment,
On Claiming the Fifth Amendment for Mixed Purpose Documents: The Problem of Categorizing
Documents as Personal or Corporate in a Business Setting, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 333, 337 n.23
(1973) (distinguishing coercion from compulsion in obtaining evidence); C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 1, § 125 (testimonial act must be compelled).
3 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944). See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 327 (1973) (fifth amendment ensures respect of "a private inner sanctum of individual
feeling and thought"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (individual has
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tions and associations are not "persons" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment." As collective entities, organizations and associations are not entitled to claim any fifth amendment privilege to
prevent self-disclosure. Upon proper demand, a collective entity
zone of privacy within which government may not intrude); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (invasion of personal liberty constitutes essence of offense); United
States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting) (right as
"an important 'substantive' value, as a safeguard of individual's.., right to private enclave
where he may lead a private life"), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). The privilege is limited to a
person who shall be compelled to be a "witness against himself." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 70 (1906) (emphasis supplied by Court). In Hale, the Court stated that the privilege was
"never intended to permit [a person] to plead the fact that some third person might be
incriminated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person ." Id. at 6970. See also Couch 409 U.S. at 328 (privilege "adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him"); Comment, supra note 2, at 335-36 (1983) (defining
"person" for fifth amendment purposes). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 120
(privilege personal in nature).
" See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). The Supreme Court defines an organization as "[having] a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities
that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its
constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only." Id. at 701. The
factors which the White Court considered were: 1) the existence of a constitution, rules and
by-laws, 2) the independent existence of the entity, 3) the formation of records and funds
distinct from its individual members. Id. at 701-02. See also Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Chief Justice Marshall defined a corporation as:
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.
These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was
created.
Id. at 636. The Supreme Court has denied fifth amendment protection to most organizations. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partnership); California Bankers
Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (incorporated bank); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694 (1944) (labor union); Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928) (unincorporated
manufacturer's association); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913) (sole shareholder
corporation); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 223 F.2d 531 (D.C.
Cir. 1955) (political party), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
' See Bettis ("no artificial organization may utilize the personal privilege against compulsory self-incrimination"); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970) ("corporation had
no privilege of its own"); White, 322 U.S. at 704 (labor union denied protection under fifth
amendment). The Supreme Court first addressed the applicability of the fifth amendment
to collective entities in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). In Hale, the Court denied a
corporation the right to plead the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 74-75. The Court reasoned that the corporation was a creature of the state, receiving special privileges and
franchises subject to the laws of the state and concurrently owed a duty to the state. Id. In
granting the corporate charter, the state reserved the power to investigate abuses and any
restriction on this power would be an investigative barrier to corporate crime. Id. Accord
Bettis, 417 U.S. at 90; White, 322 U.S. at 700. See generally M. BERGER, supra note 1, at 5766 (discussing historical, practical and functional grounds for denying fifth amendment
coverage to organizations); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 128 (general discussion of applicability of privilege to collective groups); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2259a (same).

Journal of Legal Commentary

Vol. 4: 65, 1988

may not resist production of its books and records."
I. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS By ENTITIES

A. The Collective Entity Rule
The leading case on the subject of compulsory production of
papers by a collective entity is Boyd v. United States.7 In Boyd, a
partnership was issued a subpoena compelling production of a
business invoice.8 Treating the invoice as a private business record, the Supreme Court held that the seizure of an individual's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him was
compelling him to be a witness against himself in violation of the
fifth amendment. 9
Twenty years later, in Hale v. Henkel,'0 the Supreme Court limited the holding in Boyd by establishing that corporate books and
records were not "private papers" protected by the fifth amendment. " The Court opined that there was a "clear distinction between an individual and a corporation."' 2 As a creature of the.
See infra notes 13 and 16 and accompanying text.
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
* Id. This was an action for the forfeiture of thirty-five cases of plate glass, allegedly
imported in violation of the customs laws. Id. at 617.
' Id. at 634-35. The Court held that a compelled disclosure of the contents of private
papers violated both the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 638. Although no actual
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment was involved, the Court concluded
that the same results had been achieved. Id. at 635. Requiring "an owner to produce his
private books and papers, in order to prove his breach of the laws.., is purely compelling
him to furnish evidence against himself." Id. at 637 (emphasis added). Scholars have been
unwilling to recognize the Boyd Court's alignment of the fourth and fifth amendments on
this issue. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2264 at 381 n.4 (Boyd has created unnecessary
confusion between fourth and fifth amendments); Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papersin the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343, 363 (1979) (blending of
fourth and fifth amendments in Boyd weakened fifth amendment protection); Note, Search
and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. COn. L. REV. 664,
695 (1961) (scholars unable to perceive such intimate relationship between amendments).
-0 201 U.S. 43 (1906). In Hale, a corporate officer, protected by personal immunity,
sought to invoke a fifth amendment privilege on behalf of the corporation. Id. at 46.
1 Id. at 74-75. See Sullivan, Fifth Amendment Protection and the Production of Corporate
Documents, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 747 (1987). Professor Sullivan reasoned that by establishing
documents as private or corporate the Court's focus shifted to the identity of the owner.
Id. at 751. "Thus the implicit rationale emerged that the business person's act of incorporation waived fifth amendment rights for corporate documents." Id.
1" 201 U.S. at 74. See supra notes 3 and 4.
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state, the corporation's grant included visitatorial rights by the
state and therefore the corporation had no right to refuse to submit its books and papers to examination.1"
The Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of fifth amendment protection in Wilson v. United States " where it held that a
corporate custodian could not assert his personal fifth amendment
privilege to resist the production of corporate books held in a representative capacity, although the contents proved personally incriminating.15 The Court reasoned that in assuming custody of
the books the custodian had accepted the obligation to permit
inspection.16
In United States v. White,1 7 the Supreme Court found no fifth
amendment obstacle to prevent the production of records by a labor union.' 8 Recognizing the economic power of unincorporated
organizations, the Court found that public necessity required the
regulation of such entities. 9
This reliance on the visitatorial powers of the state was followed
in Bellis v. United States.' In Bellis, the Court held that a partner
13 201 U.S. at 74-75. The Court stated that a corporation was chartered for the "benefit
of the public." Id. at 74. The charter granted certain privileges, and its powers were limited by the state. Id. The corporation had a "duty" to produce its books upon demand. Id.
at 75.
14 221 U.S. 361 (1911). In Wilson, a grand jury issued a subpoena to a corporation demanding the production of corporate letter press copy books which were in the possession
of the corporate president. Id. at 371.
10 Id. at 384-85. The Court concluded that the visitatorial powers of the state extended
to the contents of the books without regard to the conduct of the custodian. Id.
", Id. at 382. The Court reasoned that the president of the corporation maintained custody of the books to facilitate the business transactions committed to his charge. Id. at 385.
The president could assert no personal right to retain the books if another was to take his
place. Id. Subject to corporate directives, the president could assert no personal right to
retain the corporate books upon demand of the government. Id.
322 U.S. 694 (1944).
1I Id. at 701. The Court analogized a labor union to a corporation, devising a test to
categorize the union as a collective entity. See supra note 4.
19 322 U.S. at 700. The White Court stated:
[T]he absence of [visitatorial powers over] a particular type of organization does not
lessen the public necessity for making reasonable regulations of its activities effective, nor does it confer upon such an organization the purely personal privilege
against self-incrimination. Basically, the power to compel the production of the
records of any organization, whether it be incorporated or not, arises out of the
inherent and necessary power of the federal and state governments to enforce their
laws ....

Id. at 700-01.
417 U.S. 85 (1974). In Bellis, a member of a three-partner law firm that had been
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could not invoke his personal fifth amendment privilege to resist
production of partnership records since the partnership had an
institutional identity and the records were held in a representative
capacity. 1
From Boyd to Bellis, the Supreme Court distinguished between
documents held in a personal capacity and those held in a representative capacity.2" In determining the potential for self-incrimination, the collective entity decisions were concerned with the
contents of the documents subpoenaed.28 It is suggested that the
collective entity rule fails to focus on the communicative nature of
the custodian's act of production.
B. The Act of Production Doctrine

The fifth amendment does not proscribe the compelled production of evidence absent some communicative act.2 Evidence is
communicative or "testimonial" when it "reveals a person's subjective knowledge or thought processes. ' 25 It is submitted that
dissolved was held in contempt for refusing to produce partnership records pursuant to a
grand jury subpoena. Id. at 86-87.
"lId. at 100. The Court conceded that the test devised in White for determining the
applicability of the fifth amendment privilege to collective groups was not particularly helpful since the partnership embodied a mingling of personal and group interests. Id. Nevertheless the Court found the partnership to be an entity independent from its partners. Id.
at 101.
n See supra notes 9 and 16 and accompanying text.
s'See supra notes 9 and 15 and accompanying text discussing collective entity rule. See
generally Comment, supra note 11 at 749-54 (general discussion of development of collective entity rule); Note, Sole Shareholder'sPrivilege Against Self-Incrimination in Producing Corporate Documents, 59 TEMp. L.Q. 219, 226-90 (1986) (same).
" See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). The fifth amendment offers no protection against compelled display of identifiable physical characteristics. Id. at 5-6. See, e.g.,
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967) (voice exemplar); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood
sample); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (donning of clothing); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (urinalysis); State v.
Swayze, 197 Neb. 149, 247 N.W.2d 440 (1976) (paternity test); State v. Cozart, 352 S.E.2d
152 (W. Va. 1986) (breathalyzer). See generally Dann, supra note 1, 613-30 (comprehensive
discussion of admissible forms of evidence); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 124 (privilege
limited to testimonial acts).
'5 People v. Hagar, 69 N.Y.2d 141, 142, 505 N.E.2d 237, 238, 512 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795
(1987). See Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ("communication, written, oral, or otherwise [which] involves an accused's consciousness of the facts and
operations of his mind . . .is testimonial and communicative in nature"). The privilege
prohibits the state from obtaining evidence against the accused through "the cruel, simple
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth ...." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
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some methods of obtaining evidence have communicative aspects
wholly aside from the contents of the evidence 6 and the act of
producing evidence in compliance with a subpoena may involve
testimonial self-incrimination.2
In Fisher v. United States,"8 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the contents of business records produced by subpoena
were privileged under the fifth amendment.29 The Court held
that an individual may invoke his personal privilege against selfincrimination to resist compelled production of papers when the
"act of producing" itself would communicate information separate from their contents.30
Eight years later the Supreme Court successfully applied the
757, 763 (1966) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460, reh'g denied, 385 U.S.
890 (1966)). All forms of testimonial communication are protected by the privilege. See,
e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984) (physical production of business documents involved testimonial assertions); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)
(oral testimony self-incriminating); Goldsmith v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App. 3d 76, 8586, 199 Cal. Rptr. 366, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (compelled production of weapon testimonial communication); State v. Alexander, 281 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. 1979) (compelled
production of obscene film violative of fifth amendment rights). See also Schmerber, 384
U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966) (nod or head-shake is "testimonial" act). But cf. 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 2263 (privilege limited to oral disclosures). See generally Arenella, Schmerber
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 42-48
(1982) (distinguishing testimonial from real evidence).
"0See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber the Court declined to extend fifth amendment protection to physical evidence whose compulsion did not elicit incriminating testimonial communication. Id. at 764. The Court reasoned that the distinction between testimonial and
nontestimonial evidence may break down in some cases when, in obtaining the physical
evidence, actual testimonial responses would be elicited. Id.
11 See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
" 425 U.S. 391 (1976). In Fisher, an attorney sought to resist a subpoena directing the
production of tax documents entrusted to him by his client and prepared by his client's
accountants. Id. at 394-95.
" Id. at 409. The Court noted that Boyd's holding that the compelled disclosure of the
contents of private papers was prohibited by the fifth amendment "[had] not stood the test
of time." Id. at 406-07. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Fifth
Amendment Privilegefor Producing Corporate Documents, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1544, 1563 (1986)
("Fisher and Doe rendered privacy and ownership irrelevant to analysis of self-incrimination
claims").
"' See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The Court stated that compliance
with a subpoena could communicate the existence of the evidence, its possession by the
respondent, and the respondent's belief that the evidence produced was that described in
the subpoena. Id. at 410. In Fisher, the Court held that the act of production "would not
itself involve testimonial self-incrimination" because "the existence and location of the papers [were] a foregone conclusion .... " Id. at 411.
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Fisher analysis to a sole proprietor in United States v. Doe. 1 Following its decision in Fisher, the Court held that the contents of business records were not privileged. 2 In addition, the Court held
that the sole proprietor's act of producing the documents was
privileged since it involved testimonial self-incrimination."
Neither Fisher nor Doe addressed the application of the act of
production privilege to an individual holding entity documents in
a representative capacity."' Recently the United States Supreme
Court decided this issue in Braswell v. United States. 5 The Court
held that a custodian of corporate records could not resist the
compelled production of documents on the ground that the act of
production itself would prove incriminating.3 6
This Article will examine the Braswell decision and discuss the
ramifications of the case with respect to the self-incrimination
clause in the corporate context. It is submitted that the Court has
impermissibly denied corporate employees their constitutional
right against self-incrimination by ruling that the government may
use compulsion to elicit incriminating testimony from agents of
collective entities.
II.

BRASWELL

V. UNITED STATES

3 7
The petitioner Braswell was the president of two corporations.
In 1986 a federal grand jury issued a subpoena to Braswell, in his
capacity as president, ordering the production of books and
records. 8 The subpoena did not require Braswell to testify.3
81 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
32 Id. at 612.
" Id. at 617. The Doe Court relied on the findings of the District Court. Id. at 614.
" See Note, OrganizationalPapers and the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 640, 647-48 (1986). The author has interpreted the act of production privilege as
creating an exception to the collective entity rule.
" 108 S.Ct. 2284.
Id. at 2292.

"

37 Id. at 2286. Braswell's business activities consisted of the purchase and sale of equipment, land, timber, and oil and gas interests. Id. From 1965 to 1980, Braswell operated his
business as a sole proprietorship. Id. In 1980 and 1981 he incorporated his business into
World Wide Machinery Sales and Worldwide Purchasing. Id. In compliance with Mississippi law, the corporations had three directors: Braswell as president, his wife as secretarytreasurer and his mother as vice-president. Id. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-69 (1972).
" Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2286. The subpoena was directed to: "Randy Braswell, President Worldwide Machinery, Inc. [and] Worldwide Purchasing, Inc." Id. The subpoena re-
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Braswell moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that the act
of producing the records would incriminate him in violation of his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 40 The district
court denied the motion, ruling that the collective entity doctrine
prevented Braswell from asserting his fifth amendment right.41
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment.4" The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict among the circuits.'3
Braswell argued that the fifth amendment prohibits the government from compelling any act which would have independent testimonial significance and incriminate him individually." Braswell
further argued that the collective entity doctrine does not address
the issue of whether the act of production is self-incriminating. 45
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Braswell's argument, holding that the collective entity doctrine prequested "all books, records, and papers and other data relating to Worldwide Machinery
Sales, Inc., and Worldwide Purchasing, Inc., for the years 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1985." In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 191 n.1 (5th Cir. 1987), affd, 108 S.Ct 2284
(1988).
"' Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2286.
40 Id.
41 Id. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1987). The per
curiam decision noted that Braswell was managing the affairs of the corporation as close to
the manner in which a sole proprietorship would be handled. Nevertheless, the court rejected Braswell's argument that the collective entity doctrine is not applicable when the
corporation is so small as to amount to no more than the owner's alter ego. Id.
4$ Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2286.
43 Id. at 2287. Compare In re Will Roberts Corp., 816 F.2d 569, 573 (11th Cir. 1987)
(custodian may invoke fifth amendment privilege when production would be communicative in nature); In re Brown, 768 F.2d 525, 528-29 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (sole owner of
incorporated accounting firm may resist production if act would prove incriminating); In re
Two Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (where production of corporate documents would violate fifth amendment rights of individual, corporation must produce documents through some other agent); with In re Morganstern, 771 F.2d
143, 147 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (production of partnership documents not violative of fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination under collective entity rule), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1033 (1985); United States v. G&G Advertising Co., 762 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir.
1985) (production of corporate documents unprivileged); In re Vargos, 727 F.2d 941, 946
(10th Cir.) (production of papers held in representative capacity by attorney, although testimonial, are not protected), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
" Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2287. The petitioner based his argument on the doctrine espoused in Fisher and affirmed in Doe. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
4' Id. at 2290. The Court conceded that Fisher and Doe recognized a new fifth amendment analysis and that the act of production may be privileged. The Court, however, adhered to the collective entity rule having considered it not to be obsolete. Id. at 2290-91.
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vented the assertion of a fifth amendment claim. 4 6 By operating in
the corporate form, Braswell held the entity records in a representative capacity and his act of production was not deemed a personal act, but rather the act of the corporation. 4'7 The Court conceded that the custodian's "individual" act of production could
not be used in evidence against him, however, the government
had the right to use the "corporation's" act of production against
the custodian.' The Court bolstered its holding with the public
policy argument that the prosecution of white collar crime should
not be hindered.'
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy argued that the case
should have been resolved solely on the premise that the act of
production had independent testimonial significance.60 Joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Scalia, Justice Kennedy urged that
the issue must be viewed in its most essential terms: whether the
collective entity rule contains any principle which overrides an individual's fifth amendment rights?" The dissent found the majority's reliance on the agency rationale undergirding the collective
" Id. at 2292.
47 Id. at 2290-91. The Court seemed to have implied that, by taking on his representative duties, Braswell had actually waived his fifth amendment rights. Id. Following the reasoning in White, the Court stated that individuals acting in a representative capacity were
not exercising their personal rights or duties but rather those of the artificial entity. Id. at
2291. Because artificial entities have no fifth amendment privilege, an individual acting in
an official capacity may not invoke the privilege to avoid production of entity documents.
Id. The Court observed: "Any claim of fifth amendment privilege asserted by the agent
would be tantamount to a claim of privilege by the corporation-which of course possesses
no such privilege." Id.
4 Id. at 2295. The Court noted that the government could not introduce into evidence
the fact that the subpoena was served and the documents delivered by one particular individual. Id. However, the government would be permitted to offer into evidence testimony
that the corporation produced the documents subpoenaed from which a jury could infer
the custodian's possession or knowledge of their contents. Id.
41 Id. at 2294. The Court noted that "the greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by
an organization or its representatives is usually found in the official records and documents
of that organization." Id. (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944)). The
Court feared that recognition of a fifth amendment privilege would frustrate government
regulation. Id.
Id. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority had accepted
this assumption at oral argument. Id.
61 Id. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent found no support for the majority's
reliance on the collective entity rule. Id. at 2298. The collective entity decisions were premised on the claim that the custodian would be incriminated by disclosure of the documents' contents, in contrast to the act of producing the documents. Id. at 2298.
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entity rule flawed.52 Through the acts of locating and selecting
the documents demanded, a custodian conveys his personal knowledge, a fact which cannot be dismissed by clothing the act in the
language of agency." The majority's argument that the compelled production of entity documents would necessarily carry
with it a grant of constructive immunity was rejected. 5" The dis62 Id. at 2299-300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See supra notes 47 and 48 and accompanying
text.
" Id. at 2299-300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118
(1956). In Curcio, a custodian of union books had been asked to testify in a representative
rather than individual capacity as to the whereabouts of union books. Id. at 119. The
Court held that compelled testimony of that sort was constitutionally impermissible because
it would require the disclosure of personal knowledge which could not be divorced from
the custodian who spoke it. Id. at 128.
" Id. at 2300-301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority "impinges on its own analysis." Id. at 2300. A grant of constructive immunity, protecting the
individual from the introduction of any evidence pertaining to his "individual" act of production, recognized that "the Fifth Amendment protects the person without regard to his
status as corporate employee." Id. The dissent further stated that the Doe decision rejected
a constructive grant of immunity. Id. The government must make a formal request for
statutory immunity. Id. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (1982). 18 U.S.C. § 6002 provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee
or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not
refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
Id. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide
other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United
States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the
judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance
with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for
such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other
information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) A United States attorney may, .... request an order under subsection (a) of this
section when in his judgment(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the
public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (upholding constitutionality of
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sent further argued that the fifth amendment right against selfincrimination is not waived by employees of entities."
III.

RAMIFICATIONS

Although the Braswell Court sought to maintain nearly eighty
years of precedent, it is submitted that the decision obscures the
very purposes of the fifth amendment. In order to vindicate the
collective entity rule, the Court concluded that a corporate custodian's act of production is not testimonial self-incrimination, or in
the alternative, that he waives his right to exercise the privilege
upon employment. 56
As the dissent observed, the Court employed a corporate
agency fiction 57 to reach the conclusion that Braswell's use of the
corporate form was a general waiver of fifth amendment rights."
It is submitted that the chosen mechanism through which business
is conducted is not a general waiver of the right against self-incrimination. Waivers of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary acts done with sufficient awareness of the
consequences.59 The issue of waiver involves the evaluation of the
individual's subjective state of mind, in light of the totality of facts
use immunity statute).
" Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that fifth
amendment jurisprudence did not recognize acceptance of employment as a waiver of an
individual's constitutional right against self-incrimination. Id. See supra note 47.
" Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2292.
"7Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
" Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Employees do not always have
their choice of employer or the business form under which the employer operates. See id.
" Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court provided some
procedural safeguards to secure the privilege:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Id. at 444. Waiver has been defined as "the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a
known right .... ." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1417 (5th ed. 1979). See generally Note,
Waiver of the PrivilegeAgainst Self Incrimination, 14 STAN. L. REv. 811 (1962) (comprehensive
study of waiver); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 140 (waiver by disclosure of incriminating
facts); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2276(b)(1) (same).
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and circumstances." In its failure to recognize this the Braswell
decision permits undue deference to the state's interest in securing information by compulsion.
Although in many instances the act of production may imply no
self-incriminating declarations,6 1 in those situations where the production of documents would result in testimonial assertions, statutory immunity should be granted. Immunity would not impede
government investigations.62 It is submitted that the Court's constructive grant of partial use immunity is not only unworkable as
an effective safeguard against testimonial self-incrimination, but
also usurps the Justice Department's authority to grant immunity.6 3 A grant of immunity would insulate the individual solely
with respect to evidence obtained from the "act" of production. 4
The documents' contents may be used freely against the represen6
tative and the entity. 5
The majority addressed the facts of Braswell by asserting that an
individual, acting in a representative capacity, may not resist production of corporate documents on the ground that the "act"
would tend to incriminate him because all acts of a corporate cus" United States v. Carra, 604 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979). In
determining validity of waiver, courts must assess the mental capacity, educational level,
and conduct of the person holding the privilege. Toliver v. Gathright, 501 F. Supp. 148,
150 (D.C. Va. 1980).
"' See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). In Fisher, the Court stated that use of
the fifth amendment was limited to prohibit the "physical or moral compulsion executed
on the person claiming the privilege." Id. at 409-10. Documents prepared voluntarily and
requiring no testimonial affirmations or declarations by the taxpayer would not involve
testimonial self-incrimination. Id. See supra notes 24 and 30 and accompanying text.
*, See Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
6' See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). In Doe, the Court refused to adopt a
doctrine of constructive use immunity. Id. at 616. Under this proposed doctrine, "the
courts would impose a requirement on the government not to use the incriminating aspects
of the act of production against the person claiming the privilege even though the statutory procedures had not been followed." Id. The Court refused to extend to the courts the
Justice Department's "exclusive authority to grant immunities." Id. (quoting Pillsbury Co.
v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1983)). See also notes 48 and 54 and accompanying text.
" Id. A grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege against self-incrimination. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 253 & n.8 (1983); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 107 (1964)
(White, J., concurring).
See Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Testimony pursuant to a
grant of immunity shifts to the government the burden of proving that all the evidence
comes from legitimate independent sources. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
461-62 (1972). Testimony may be used against the witness neither directly nor derivatively.
See 18 U.S.C. § 6002, supra note 54.
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todian are those of the corporation and not the individual.6 6 The
Court, however, left open the very question on which Braswell
turns: "whether the agency rationale supports compelling a custodian to produce corporate records when the custodian is able to
establish ... that he is the sole employee and officer of the corporation," thereby leaving the jury to inevitably conclude that he
produced the records?" If the Court had addressed this question,
its reliance on the collective entity rule would appear to be misplaced and its agency rationale inappropriate.6 8 A recognition of
the right to assert a privilege in such an instance would be based
on the belief that "the fifth amendment protects the person without regard to his status as corporate employee" and once this is
admitted, the Court's support for the collective entity rule
collapses. 6 '
CONCLUSION

The Braswell decision unnecessarily limits the scope of fifth
amendment protection. In its effort to curtail corporate crime, the
Court has relegated the individual to a lower consideration. The
ideals embodied in the fifth amendment do not permit such action. It is submitted that individual rights should not be sacrificed
for the government's interest in the prosecution of white collar
crime. The simple solution is a statutory grant of immunity for
testimonial self-incriminating acts of production.
Catherine A. Collins

" See Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2295. See also supra note 47.
7 See Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2295.

See Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). " The majority does not challenge the assumption that compliance with the subpoena would require testimonial selfincrimination . . . the question presented ... is whether an individual may be compelled,
simply by virtue of his status as a corporate custodian ... [tihe majority relies solely on the
collective entity rule in holding such compulsion constitutional." Id.
'9 See Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

